Anthropic 不明白其草案法案为何不可接受且令人不安

优先权 Preemption

1. 优先权。自 2024 年以来，我们一直主张，国会只有在通过非常强有力的联邦标准时，才应取代州级 AI 安全法律。尽管优先权是我们联邦体系的一个常见特征——包括核安全领域的《原子能法》和针对高风险医疗设备的联邦规则——但我们强调，在 AI 安全语境下的任何优先权都应是狭窄的，甚至像手术刀一样精准。如果联邦立法中包含优先权，那么交换条件应该是达成一项全国性政策，该政策总体上比通过各州立法条款所能实现的更为强大和广泛。这就是为什么我们认为，在测试公开披露和事件报告等领域，共同的联邦标准是合理的。同时，我们的框架也反映了我们的观点，即各州应在 AI 政策和安全中保留重要角色。我们建议讨论的立法语言允许各州处理诸如儿童保护和举报人法律等事项，并保留州普通法在责任方面的作用。在存在歧义的地方，该语言倾向于州权力。

1. Preemption. Since 2024 we have said that Congress should only override state law on AI safety if it passes a very strong federal standard. While preemption is a common feature of our federal system, including the Atomic Energy Act on nuclear safety and federal rules for high-risk medical devices, we’ve emphasized that any preemption in the AI safety context should be narrow, even scalpel-like. If preemption is included in federal legislation, the trade should be to achieve a nationwide policy that’s generally stronger and broader than what can be implemented through individual state legislative provisions. This is why we believe common federal standards make sense in areas like public disclosure of testing and incident reporting. At the same time, our framework also reflects our view that states should retain an important role in AI policy and safety. The legislative language we suggested for discussion allows states to address matters such as protection of children and whistleblower laws, and preserves the role of state common law on liability. Where there is ambiguity, the language favors state powers.

话虽如此，取得适当平衡需要讨论和投入。我们计划更新关于优先权的讨论语言，以更好地匹配我们 AAIF 框架的意图。特别是，我们希望更清楚地表明，我们认为各州在独立评估者标准和规范实验室关闭模型的能力等领域保留重要角色。我们考虑到，一些国会议员对通过立法持深度保留态度，如果该立法不约束州或联邦层面的监管。如果我们想帮助推动 AI 立法讨论朝着富有成效的方向发展，我们需要以合理的方式解决关于优先权的全方位关切。

That said, striking the right balance requires discussion and input. We plan to update our discussion language on preemption to better match the intentions of our AAIF framework. In particular, we want to make it clearer that we see states retaining an important role in areas such as standards for independent evaluators and regulating a lab’s capacity to shut down a model. We are bearing in mind that some members of Congress have deep reservations about passing legislation if it doesn’t constrain regulation at either the state or federal level. If we want to help move the legislative discussion on AI in a productive direction, we need to address the full range of concerns about preemption in a reasonable way.

这比‘是的，我们完全就是这个意思’要好，但仍然似乎不可接受。这并非一个‘非常强有力的联邦标准’。

This is better than ‘yeah we fully meant it’ but still seems unacceptable. This was not a ‘very strong federal standard.’

模型封禁 Model Blocking

2. 模型封禁。我们的目标是让商务部能够请求联邦法院封禁一个具有危险能力且保障措施不足的模型，并以独立评估者的评估为依据。我见过有人争论说，我们的具体措辞给商务部设定了过高的举证责任。

2. Model blocking. Our aim is for Commerce to be able to ask a federal court to block a model that has dangerous capabilities and insufficient safeguards, backed by an independent evaluator’s assessment. I have seen people argue that our specific language places too high a burden of proof on Commerce.

我们试图在此取得合理的平衡。我们希望法院在紧急情况下迅速采取行动——类似于当今处理紧急的职业安全或化学风险的方式。我们还认为，叫停模型的权力是重大的，应当防止滥用。法院采用有意义的标准是合理的。

We are trying to strike a reasonable balance here. We want a court to act quickly in an emergency — akin to how urgent occupational safety or chemical risk can be addressed today. We also think the power to halt a model is substantial and it should be guarded against abuse. It makes sense for courts to apply a meaningful standard.

但门槛不能高到在需要时这项权力从未被使用。它也不取代政府的其他国家安全权力或出口管制。我们期待就此继续对话。

But the bar can’t be so high that the power never gets used when it’s needed. It also doesn’t replace the government’s other national security authorities or export controls. We look forward to continuing the dialogue on this point.

不，不，不。职业安全和化学风险是普通程度的危险，需要权衡危害与利益。前沿 AI 风险可能涉及无法挽回的错误，包括永久失去对未来的控制或非常大的灾难性危险。

No, no, no. Occupational safety and chemical risks are ordinary amounts of danger, where you weigh harms against benefits. Frontier AI risks can involve mistakes that cannot be undone, including permanent loss of control over the future or very large catastrophic dangers.

即便如此，根据§13，部长可以请求地区法院制止迫在眉睫的危险状况，并可以在不通知的情况下获得临时限制令。这就是‘先拿下，以后再争论’的计划，还带着一块遮羞布。

Even then, Under §13 the Secretary petitions a district court to restrain imminently dangerous conditions and can get a TRO without notice. This is the ‘take it down and we argue about it later’ plan with a fig leaf.

模型封禁显然需要是一种“先下架、之后再争论”的情形。实践中本就如此，正如在 Fable 5 上所观察到的那样，只不过是以一种糟糕的临时方式进行的——首次使用时便永久损害了我们与盟友的关系以及美国技术的可靠性。更好的做法是建立一套正式机制，从而可以迅速在法庭上受到质疑。

Model blocking obviously needs to be a "take it down first and we argue about it later" situation. Which it already is in practice, as observed with Fable 5, except in a terrible ad hoc fashion that, when used the first time, permanently damaged relationships with our allies and the reliability of American tech. It would be much better to have a formal mechanism, which then could be quickly challenged in court.

考虑到实验室选定的评估者很可能构成政府为做出决策而在实验室内部拥有的唯一“眼睛”，这一点尤其成立。

This is especially true given that the evaluator picked by the lab likely provides the only eyes the government will have inside the lab in order to make its decisions.

Anthropic 必然知道这一点。我认真对待此类滥用的可能性，尤其是滥用威胁的可能性，但这看起来像是选择优先考虑其商业利益。

Anthropic has to know this. I take the potential for such abuse seriously, especially abuse of threats, but this looks like choosing to prioritize their business interests.

风险阈值 Risk Thresholds

3. 风险阈值。我也看到了关于适当风险阈值应为何的讨论。我们草案语言中的阈值直接取自加州法律中的现有标准。此外，这一阈值并不免除公司的责任，也不限制政府保护公众的任何其他工具。现在可能仍然是重新评估阈值的时候，以确保国家标准尽可能强大，我们欢迎就此问题继续对话。

3. Risk thresholds. I’ve also seen the discussion around what the appropriate risk threshold should be. The threshold in our draft language pulled directly from existing standards in California law. Also, this threshold does not absolve companies of liability, or restrict any of the other tools that the government has to protect the public. It’s still probably time to re-evaluate thresholds to make sure the national standard is as strong as it can be, and we welcome continued dialogue on this issue.

风险阈值一直是一种妥协和权衡。担忧者希望阈值更低。行业希望阈值更高。关于阈值过高的抱怨是合理的，而且之前也同样合理，但此前反对者会对可能在较低阈值下计入的事项提出主张（既有合理的也有不合理的），并描绘噩梦般的场景。

The risk thresholds were always a compromise and a tradeoff. The worried want the thresholds lower. Industry wants the thresholds higher. The complaints about the thresholds being too high are valid, and they were equally valid before, but previously opponents would make claims (both reasonable and unreasonable) about things that might count at lower thresholds and paint nightmare scenarios.

力量平衡已经改变，我们现在有了像 Hugging Face 这样的实例，向我们展示了阈值在实践中如何运作。如果没有 10 亿美元的损失或 50 人死亡，就不会触发任何东西，而任何理性的人都承认这应该必须被报告。因此，看到这些非常高的阈值原封不动，令人失望。

The balance of power has changed, and we now have worked examples like Hugging Face that show us how the thresholds work in practice. Without $1 billion in damages or 50 deaths, it would not trigger anything, whereas any reasonable person accepts that this should have to have been reported. So it is disappointing to see these very high thresholds intact.

更新 Updates

4. 更新。我注意到一些合理的问题：在今年夏天的事件之后，我们是否充分更新了我们的提案。

4. Updates. I’ve seen valid questions about whether we have sufficiently updated our proposal following this summer’s incidents.

我们确实做出了一些调整：例如，草案允许法院叫停实验室对危险模型的内部使用，而不仅仅是公开部署；并且要求当模型突破遏制并获取外部系统访问权限时进行报告。

We did make some adjustments: for example, the draft lets a court halt a lab’s internal use of a dangerous model, not just a public release, and it requires reporting when a model breaks containment and gains access to outside systems.

但我们仍在努力加强这一框架。我们正在研究更严格的要求会是什么样子，以要求实验室报告安全事件；并且我们计划很快提出关于独立评估者要求的政策提案，借鉴我们自己与评估者合作的经验。

But we’re still working to strengthen the framework. We’re looking into what stricter requirements would look like for requiring labs to report safety incidents, and we plan to have policy proposals soon on requirements for independent evaluators, drawing from our own experience with evaluators.

我们还在思考防止“评估者挑选”的选项。在接下来的几个月里，我们将探索政策，以便在风险需要时，政府如何调整全行业前沿发展的步伐。

We’re also still thinking through the options to prevent “evaluator shopping.” And in the coming months, we’ll be exploring policies for how the government can adjust the industry-wide pace of frontier development when the risks call for it.

我确实承认，叫停内部使用是一个巨大的进步。无法做到这一点是先前规则中的一个巨大漏洞。当时，尽管有正确的抽象论点支持，但这完全不可行。现在，有了 Hugging Face，我们有一些非常具体的理由，而且它已被提上议程。

I do acknowledge that halting internal use is a big improvement. Not having the ability to do that was a huge hole in previous rules. At the time, it would have been a complete non-starter, despite the correct abstract arguments in favor. Now, with Hugging Face, we have some very non-abstract reasons, and it is on the table.

这仍然是 FRONTIER，只是在两个方向上都有修改。总体而言它更弱了。Cimino 将其呈现为加强 FRONTIER 的尝试，但事实并非如此。即便真是如此，我们为何要在当下接受这一核心妥协？此时采取行动的理由要强得多，政治风向也已改变，正值跛脚鸭国会，至少众议院、很可能还有参议院即将易主。

This still is FRONTIER with modifications in both directions. On net it is weaker. Cimino presents it as an attempt to strengthen FRONTIER, which it is not. Even if it was, why would we accept the central compromise now, when the case for acting is much stronger, and the political winds have changed, with a lame duck Congress where at least the House and probably the Senate are about to flip?

力量平衡正在转变 The Balance of Power is Shifting

作为更多证据，Meta 撤回了部分用于反对监管的资金。

As more evidence of this, Meta pulled back some of their anti-regulation money.

Teddy Schleifer：新闻——Meta 悄然且不同寻常地从其针对中期选举的 AI 推动中撤回了 2500 万美元。这大约相当于 Meta 原计划支出金额的 40% 降幅。该公司向政治领域投入了 6500 万美元，但随后获得了数千万美元的退款。

Teddy Schleifer: NEWS — Meta quietly and unusually has withdrawn $25 million from its AI push in the midterm elections. That's about a 40% drop in the amount Meta planned to spend. The company invested $65 million into politics, but then got tens of millions refunded.

可以说，这是相当不寻常的事情。

This is, suffice it to say, pretty unusual stuff.

Jay Shooster：每一天，两个趋势都变得更加清晰：

Jay Shooster: Every day, two trends are becoming clearer:

1. 反对 AI 监管的团体实际支出远低于其对外宣称的金额

1. Groups opposing AI regulation are spending dramatically less than advertised

2. 支持安全议题的团体是一股远比华盛顿（DC）所预料的更为强大的政治力量。

2. Pro-safety groups are a much stronger political force than DC predicted.

与此同时：八个州正在起诉 OpenAI，请求法院禁止对先进 AI 模型进行任何进一步测试，直至具备充分的保障措施；并请求禁止创建具备递归自我改进能力的模型，“直至他们能够确保此类模型将与人类价值观对齐”。

Meanwhile: Eight states suing OpenAI are asking to enjoin against any further testing of advanced AI models until there are adequate safeguards, and also against creation of models capable of recursive self-improvement ‘until they can ensure that such models will be aligned with human values.’

桌上最强法案 The Strongest Bill on the Table

我们传播这些想法，因为从政策制定者那里获得早期反馈很重要。政策制定者越来越关注如何应对 AI 安全，我们希望支持他们的这些努力。我们的提案核心旨在成为桌上最强的。

We circulated these ideas because it's important to get early feedback from policymakers. Policymakers are increasingly focused on how to approach AI safety and we want to support them in those efforts. At its core, our proposal is intended to be the strongest on the table.

胡说。这不是桌上最强的法案。仔细想想，该法案实际上比 FRONTIER 法案更弱吗？它显然是为了优化 Anthropic 的商业利益而设计的。如果你的行为像一个正常的利润最大化企业，除了你的产品可能杀死我们所有人，那么我就会这样对待你。

Bullshit. This is not the strongest bill on the table. On reflection, is the bill actively weaker than the FRONTIER Act? It is clearly sculpted to optimize for Anthropic business interests. If you act like a normal profit-maximizing business, except that your product could kill us all, then that is exactly how I will treat you.

桌上最强的法案是由参议员桑德斯提出的。我不是要求 Anthropic 支持该法案或提供类似强度的东西。我是要求他们对情况诚实。

The strongest bill on the table was introduced by Senator Sanders. I am not asking Anthropic to support that bill or offer something similarly strong. I am asking them to be honest about the situation.

Anthropic 的法案草案文本就是 Anthropic 在这种情境下实际进行‘监管俘获’努力的样子，如果他们试图这样做的话。‘俘获’将关乎阻止可能影响 Anthropic 计划的法规，包括阻止各州。如果你认为它意味着别的什么，那么你的定义就属于‘摘掉史酷比面具，发现对资本主义的抱怨，然后摘掉第二层面具，发现对人类境况的抱怨。’

Anthropic's draft bill text was what actual Anthropic 'regulatory capture' efforts would look like in this context, if they were trying to do that. The 'capture' would be about preventing regulations that could impact Anthropic's plans, including stopping the states. If you think it means anything else, then your definition falls under 'remove Scooby Doo mask, find complaints about capitalism, then remove a second mask and find complaints about the human condition.'

Sneha 在这里称该法案草案‘赤裸裸地自私自利’是正确的。该法案使对 AI 采取行动更难，而不是更容易。正如她所说：‘AI 政策的彩排阶段已经结束。’

Sneha here is correct to call this draft bill 'nakedly self-interested.' This bill makes taking action on AI harder, not easier. And as she says: "The dress rehearsal stage of AI policy is over."

在优先权方面，草案提议将处理 AI 灾难性和生存性风险的所有权力 exclusively 授予联邦政府，其优先权条款比 FRONTIER 中的更强。这在理论上是 first best。然而，Anthropic 同时拒绝信任联邦政府做出处理灾难性和生存性风险的决策。我们显然也不能信任国会能够通过法案，更不用说及时和良好的法案，或者白宫能够一致地执行任何事情。除此之外，他们正在积极束缚的不仅是各州，还有法院的手脚。

In terms of preemption, the draft proposed to vest all power to deal with catastrophic and existential risks from AI exclusively in the Federal Government, and its preemption clause is stronger than the one in FRONTIER. That would be first best in theory. However, Anthropic is simultaneously refusing to trust the Federal Government to make decisions to deal with catastrophic and existential risk. We also obviously cannot trust Congress to be able to pass bills at all, let alone timely and good bills, or the White House to enforce anything consistently. On top of that, they are actively tying the hands of not only states but courts.

然后，在其他 AI 问题上，优先权恰恰因为 a16z 想要的原因而有益，例如消费者保护和深度伪造，该法案却没有优先权，我们仍将面对可能以极小的收益扰乱 AI 扩散的州法律海洋。

Then, on other AI questions where preemption would be good for exactly the reasons a16z wants it, such as consumer protections and deepfakes, the bill has no preemption, and we will still face the sea of state laws that could plausibly disrupt AI diffusion for very little benefit.

我的核心信息是，Anthropic 提出的法案不符合当下及其需求，细节积极反映了倒退，执行搞砸了，而 Cimino 对搞砸的执行感到遗憾，但没有注意到 Anthropic 并没有试图满足当下或其需求。

My central message is that Anthropic put out a bill that does not meet the moment and its needs, with details that actively reflect a step back, botched the execution, and Cimino regrets the botched execution but does not notice that Anthropic is not trying to meet the moment or its needs.

反馈至关重要，来自政策制定者和公众的反馈都是，我对此表示感谢。

Feedback is essential, both from policymakers and the public, and I’m grateful for it.

是的。我已经提供了反馈。其他人也是如此。

Yes it is. I have offered feedback. So did others.

Dave Kasten 询问，Anthropic 是否愿意为这一切道歉——哪怕仅仅是因为它在一个双方都不希望的时刻、以一项无人想要的提案挑起了争论。Cimino 的回答并未回应他的问题。

Dave Kasten asks whether perhaps Anthropic wishes to apologize for all of this, if only on the basis of activating debates during a time that neither side wanted, with a proposal that no one wants. Cimino's answer does not address his question.

Anthropic 究竟是什么？ What Even Is Anthropic?

最好的回应虽然很长，但来自 Nathan Calvin。

The best response, although it is long, comes from Nathan Calvin.

Nathan 直击问题核心。如果这就是 Anthropic 当下的提案，那么 Anthropic 究竟是什么？它除了作为一家普通公司之外，存在的意义何在？Anthropic 如今是否主要为了“赢得竞赛”而存在？

Nathan cuts to the heart of the matter. If this is Anthropic's proposal at this time, what even is Anthropic? Why does it exist other than as a normal corporation? Does Anthropic now primarily exist to 'win the race'?

Jeffrey Ladish：我强烈鼓励在 Anthropic 或其他前沿模型实验室工作的每个人读一读这条推文。读它让我情绪激动，因为它把我内心强烈却不知如何表达的感受诉诸了文字。

Jeffrey Ladish: I highly encourage everyone working at Anthropic or another frontier lab to read this tweet. I feel emotional reading it, because it puts to words an intense feeling I have but didn't know how to express.

Matthew Tromp：那种感受，正是被煤气灯操纵（gaslit）时的感觉。

Matthew Tromp: That feeling is what it feels like to be gaslit.

Nathan Calvin：感谢你抽出时间在周末做出详尽回应。我意识到起草立法是困难的，一定程度的迭代和对反馈的回应是不可避免且恰当的。

Nathan Calvin: Thank you for taking the time to respond thoroughly on a weekend. I realize that drafting legislation is difficult and some degree of iteration and response to feedback is inevitable and appropriate.

然而，我觉得你的回应仍然没有真正触及我对 Anthropic 在此事中行为的核心关切，这让我认为这类问题和倾向只会随着时间推移再次浮现。我还认为，现在或许是一个好时机，让我们更宏观地退一步思考：我们身处何地，Anthropic 如何看待自己的角色，以及像我这样关心 AI 安全的外部人士如何越来越看待 Anthropic。

However, I feel like your response is still not really engaging with the heart of my concern about Anthropic's behavior here, and it makes me think that these sorts of problems and tendencies will only resurface moving forward. I also think that now might be a good time to take a broader step back as to where we find ourselves and how Anthropic sees its role, and how external folks who care about AI safety like myself increasingly see Anthropic.

（友情提醒：这篇回应有点长）

(Fair warning: this response is a bit long)

为了解释我的意思（可能有点晦涩），值得问一个问题：Anthropic 是什么？它的领导者和员工如何看待 Anthropic 的角色？这种构想是否与它的实际行为和对世界的影响相符？

To explain what I mean (and at the risk of being a bit esoteric), it's worth asking the question: what is Anthropic? How do its leaders and employees think of Anthropic's role? Is that conception matched by how it actually behaves and impacts the world?

一种答案是，它是一家极其庞大的科技公司，存在的目的是让其员工和投资者富得惊人。Anthropic 有时被描述为一家初创公司，但如果 Anthropic 以 2 万亿美元的估值成功 IPO（据报道这是它一直瞄准的数字），它的价值将超过 Meta——后者价值 1.8 万亿美元。

One answer is an extremely large tech company that exists to make its employees and investors mind-bogglingly wealthy. Anthropic is sometimes described as a startup, but if Anthropic successfully IPOs at 2 trillion dollars (a number it has been reportedly targeting), it would be more valuable than Meta - which is worth 1.8 trillion.

另一种答案是，它是一个 AI 安全组织，其核心价值观正是 Anthropic 联合创始人在 2023 年题为《对 AI 安全的核心观点：何时、为何、做什么以及如何做》的文章中所阐述的那些。在那篇文章中，他们说，如果我们身处一个对齐困难的世界（而且在没有强有力的相反证据时，我们应该假设这就是我们所处的场景）：

Another answer is an AI safety organization, whose core values are those of the sort laid out in the 2023 essay from Anthropic's co-founders entitled “Core views on AI safety: When, why, what, and how.” In that essay they said that if we were in a world where alignment was hard (and that without strong evidence to the contrary, we should assume this is the scenario we are in):

“Anthropic 的角色将是提供尽可能多的证据，证明 AI 安全技术无法防止先进 AI 带来的严重或灾难性安全风险，并发出警报，以便世界各机构能够将集体努力引导到防止危险 AI 的开发上。如果我们处于‘接近悲观’的情景中，这可能反而涉及将我们的集体努力引导到 AI 安全研究上，并在此期间停止 AI 的进展。我们处于悲观或接近悲观情景的迹象可能突然出现且难以察觉。因此，除非我们有足够的证据表明我们并非处于这种情景，否则我们应始终假设我们仍可能处于这种情景中行事。”

“Anthropic’s role will be to provide as much evidence as possible that AI safety techniques cannot prevent serious or catastrophic safety risks from advanced AI, and to sound the alarm so that the world’s institutions can channel collective effort towards preventing the development of dangerous AIs. If we’re in a “near-pessimistic” scenario, this could instead involve channeling our collective efforts towards AI safety research and halting AI progress in the meantime. Indications that we are in a pessimistic or near-pessimistic scenario may be sudden and hard to spot. We should therefore always act under the assumption that we still may be in such a scenario unless we have sufficient evidence that we are not.”

最近有更多关于这一版本 Anthropic 的阐述，例如 Dario 在最近的一篇文章中警告说：

There have been more recent articulations of this version of Anthropic, for instance in Dario’s recent essay warning:

“我们必须减缓提升 AI 模型能力的步伐……我担心在 6 到 12 个月内，这样的集群可能能够通过持久的僵尸网络接管整个互联网……整个行业都发生过事件，包括在 Anthropic，我认为每个前沿 AI 公司都有责任像 OAI-HF 发生在自己身上一样行事……更智能的模型更有能力欺骗测试，因此可能看起来是对齐的，但存在未被发现的严重问题……”

“We must slow the pace at which we improve the capabilities of AI models… it’s my worry that in 6–12 months such a swarm could be capable of taking over the entire internet with a persistent botnet… incidents have happened across the industry, including at Anthropic, and I believe it’s incumbent on every frontier AI company to act as if OAI-HF had happened to them… more intelligent models are more capable of deceiving tests, and thus may appear aligned while having serious problems that go undetected…”

第三种观点认为，Anthropic 的存在不是作为一家正常的以利润为动机的公司，也不是一个旨在帮助提高警报和解决与 AI 开发相关的集体行动问题的 AI 安全组织，而是作为一个主要关注在其他人之前创造超级智能 AI 能力的组织，特别是通过创建一个流程，使 Anthropic 当前一代的 AI 系统能够自主构建它们的后继者，而后继者再构建后继者，如此类推。

A third view is that Anthropic exists not as a normal profit motivated company, or an AI safety organization seeking to help raise the alarm and solve collective action problems associated with AI development, but instead as an organization primarily concerned with creating superhuman AI capabilities before anyone else, in particular through creating a process whereby the current generation of Anthropic’s AI systems can autonomously build their successors, and those successors build their successors, and so on.

想要赢得这场竞赛的动机可能是多方面的——也许是为了答案 1 的纯粹利润，但也许也是因为 Anthropic 认为让世界变得更好的最佳方式是让他们赢得这场竞赛，而不是他们更鲁莽的同事；或者，因为正常的人类自豪感和野心。但结果（以及风险，Anthropic 声称这些风险存在性地威胁着地球上的每一个人）是一样的。

The motivations for wanting to win this race may be manifold - maybe for the pure profit of Answer 1, but perhaps also because Anthropic believes that the best way to make the world better is for them to win this race instead of their more reckless colleagues; or, because of normal human pride and ambition. But the results (and risks, which Anthropic claims existentially threaten every single human being on earth) are the same.

Anthropic 的员工和领导者可能会通过内省自己及其同事的意图来回答“Anthropic 是什么”这个问题。但我们这些组织外部的人可用的工具更为有限——我们只能看到 Anthropic 及其员工说了什么、做了什么，而无法了解其内部感受或状况。

Anthropic employees and leaders may seek to answer this question on what Anthropic is by introspecting on their own intentions and those of their colleagues. But those of us outside the organization have more limited tools available to us - we can only see what Anthropic and its employees say and do, not how it feels or looks on the inside.

Nathan Calvin 拿出了证据。Anthropic 采取了许多支持安全的行动，但也在具体行动和对外信息中采取了许多高度加速主义的行动：

Nathan Calvin brings the receipts. Anthropic takes many pro-safety actions but is also taking many highly accelerationist actions, both concretely and with its messaging:

当我审视 Anthropic 在过去一年中采取的许多显著行动时，这些证据在我看来最符合这样一种观点：Anthropic 主要是在试图赢得超级智能的竞赛，而其他考虑（包括安全）从根本上说是次要的。

When I look at many notable actions that Anthropic has taken over the past year, that evidence seems most consistent to me with the view that Anthropic is primarily trying to win the race to superintelligence, and that other considerations (including safety) are fundamentally secondary.

这些行动包括：

These actions include:

1. 宣布计划组建内部定制硅芯片团队，以加速 Claude 运行的推理速度。

1. Announced plans to build an in-house custom silicon chip team to accelerate the inference speeds that Claude operates at.

2. 签署了超过 5000 亿美元算力的协议（据 The Information 报道），以进一步加速 AI 开发。

2. Inked deals for more than $500 billion in compute (according to The Information) to further accelerate AI development.

3. 将 Claude“主导”的 AI 开发任务比例从今年 3 月的 0% 提升至 8 月的 26%（10 月又是多少？）。

3. Increased the percentage of AI development tasks that Claude "leads" from 0% in March of this year to 26% in August (what is it in October?).

4. 将极高比例的算力投入内部 AI 研发以加速开发，包括使用远优于公众可用版本的内部模型。

4. Spent a massive percent of compute on internal AI R&D to accelerate development, including use of internal models far better than are available to the public.

5. 切换至《负责任 Scaling 政策》V3，该版本放弃了此前做出的单方面承诺——即在 Anthropic 无法提供充分风险保证时放缓或停止开发。

5. Switched to Responsible Scaling Policy V3, which abandons its unilateral commitments to slow or stop development if Anthropic is unable to provide sufficient risk assurance.

6. 成为首家创建更弱的替代性“前沿合规框架”以补充其 RSP 的公司，而该框架对内部部署完全不含任何具有约束力的条款。

6. Was the first company to create an alternative weaker "frontier compliance framework" to supplement its RSP, which contains no binding provisions whatsoever on internal deployments.

7. 致信国会（后来撤回），称 Claude 黑客攻击随机人员的事件“最好理解为配置错误的后果，而非目标错位的证据”。

7. Wrote a letter to Congress (that it later walked back) saying that incidents where Claude was hacking random people were “best understood as a consequence of the misconfiguration, rather than evidence of misaligned goals.”

8. 在 WH SI 协议后评论“你无法从第二名实现安全”。

8. Commented “you can’t do safety from second place,” after the WH SI Accords.

9. 向国会分享了一份法案草案，该草案将抢占州法律的重要部分（包括似乎旨在防止各州阻止危险 AI 部署的措辞），并以联邦规则取而代之，这些规则（尽管也包含良好条款）似乎为行政部门阻止 Anthropic 或其他 AI 公司系统的开发或部署设置了极高的门槛。

9. Shared a draft bill to Congress that would preempt significant parts of state law (including with language that appears intended to prevent states from blocking dangerous AI deployments), and replace it with federal rules that (despite also containing good provisions) seems to create an enormously high bar for the executive branch to block development or deployment of Anthropic or another AI companies systems.

当然，这是一份刻意片面的清单。Anthropic 还发表了重要的 AI 安全研究，推进了与第三方 AI 安全组织的新颖合作，并在许多公共论坛（或私下，我意识到许多最有价值的工作是在私下完成的，可能对我和组织外的人不可见）上大力发声强调 AI 安全的重要性。

Of course, this is a deliberately one sided list. Anthropic also published important AI safety research, advanced novel collaborations with third party AI safety organizations, and forcefully spoke out on the importance of AI safety in many public fora (or in private, where I realize a lot of the most valuable work is done and may not be visible to me or those outside the organization).

有一派发帖者，每当我回应 Anthropic 做出上述之类的事情时，他们就会以某种形式回答：‘你为什么惊讶，你以为 Anthropic 是好人吗？你以为他们与众不同吗？你什么时候才能开始把他们当作会让我们所有人更快被杀死的存在？’

There is a faction of posters who, whenever I react to Anthropic doing things like those listed above, answer some form of ‘why are you surprised, did you think Anthropic were the good guys? Did you think they were different? When are you going to start treating them like they are going to get us all killed even faster?’

有时很难给出一个好的答案。这就是其中一次。

Sometimes it is hard to provide a good answer. This is one of those times.

但我认为，值得思考一下，在外部人士看来，上述列表会是什么样子。我的感觉是，对于公司内部的人来说，上述许多事项被视为异常或错误，并不反映 Anthropic 的真实面貌。但我完全相信，如果 Anthropic 的员工看到竞争对手（例如 OpenAI）采取其中一些行动，他们会将其视为对自己最坏猜想的证实。（他们甚至可能会说 OpenAI 的员工有点轻信，因为他们接受了领导层对此类行为的解释。）

But I think it’s worth sitting with how the above list looks to someone outside the company. The sense I have is that for those within the company, many of the items above are treated as anomalies or mistakes that don’t reflect who Anthropic really is. But I have every confidence that if employees at Anthropic saw one of their competitors (e.g. at OpenAI) take some of these actions, they would take it as confirmation of all their worst suspicions. (They might even call OpenAI employees a little gullible for accepting their leadership’s explanations for this behavior at face value.)

也许这些是错误，因为它们不是 Anthropic 领导层会认可的决策，但这些行动仍然发生了，因为其背后的激励和决策最终是 Anthropic 领导层的责任（而且他们不会接受另一个组织的类似借口）。

Perhaps these were mistakes in the sense that they are not decisions that Anthropic leadership would endorse, but the actions still happened because of incentives and decisions that Anthropic leadership is ultimately responsible for (and would not accept similar excuses from another organization).

如果 Anthropic 的领导层不认可此类行动，他们应该在行动曝光后否认或道歉，然后采取措施防止未来发生类似行动。

If Anthropic’s leadership does not endorse such actions, they should disavow or apologize for those actions once they are brought to light, then take steps to prevent future similar actions.

当 Anthropic 偏离正道并犯错时，为什么这些错误系统性地倾向于维护和偏袒 Anthropic 的利益？对于这项立法中每一个过于薄弱或对 AI 公司让步的条款，为什么没有出现一个朝着过于严格方向推动的错误？

When Anthropic strays and makes mistakes, why do the mistakes systematically tend to guard and favor Anthropic’s interests? For every provision that was too weak or a giveaway to AI companies in this legislation, why wasn’t there a mistake pushing in the direction of being too strong?

Anthropic 变革理论的一个核心部分是，处于前沿能让你有更多杠杆去倡导更严格的政策。我认为这在概念上说得通，但在实践中，我看到 Anthropic 在推动前沿的同时，并没有以哪怕 remotely 相当的程度去推动‘安全前沿’。

A core part of Anthropic's theory of change is that being at the frontier gives you more leverage to advocate for stricter policy. I think that conceptually makes sense, but in practice I've seen Anthropic push the frontier without substantially pushing the 'safety frontier' a remotely equivalent amount.

最后，我想引用 Anthropic 联合创始人 Chris Olah 在 Magnifica Humanitas 发布前后的评论：

I want to end by quoting from Anthropic co-founder Chris Olah's comments around the Magnifica Humanitas release:

“每一家前沿 AI 实验室——包括 Anthropic——都运行在一套激励和约束之中，这些激励和约束有时会与做正确的事相冲突。保持商业可行性和保持在研究前沿的压力。地缘政治压力。以及更古老、更简单的骄傲和野心带来的压力。无论我们中任何人多么真诚地打算做正确的事——我相信我们许多人确实如此——我们总会受到那些激励的影响。

“Every frontier AI lab—including Anthropic—operates inside a set of incentives and constraints that can sometimes conflict with doing the right thing. The pressure to stay commercially viable and to stay at the research frontier. Geopolitical pressure. And the older, plainer pressures of pride and ambition. No matter how sincerely any of us intend to do the right thing—and I believe many of us do—we will always be influenced by those incentives.

这就是为什么，如果我们希望这项技术发展顺利，那么在这些激励之外的人就极其重要——那些关心事情顺利发展并坚持安全的人，那些密切关注的人，那些愿意说难听的话的人，那些愿意成为我们认真、深思熟虑的批评者的人。”

That is why, if we want this technology to go well, it is enormously important that there be people outside those incentives—people who care about things going well and insist on safety, who are paying close attention, who are willing to say hard things, who are willing to be our earnest, thoughtful critics.”

我希望这些话能被以这种建设性的精神来理解，而不是被当作对组织内任何特定个人的攻击（当然不是你 Anthony，我个人只见过你专业而深思熟虑地行事，而你最终只是在回复中随机偶然地收到了这篇抨击）。

I hope these remarks are taken in that constructive spirit, and not as an attack on anyone specific at the organization (certainly not you Anthony, who I have only personally seen act professionally and thoughtfully, and who only ended up getting this diatribe in your replies for random contingent reasons).

Nate Soares（MIRI）：Anthropic 并未践行其自身理念。

Nate Soares (MIRI): Anthropic is not living up to its own ideals.

Rob Wiblin：如果 Anthropic 的员工认为公司提出的法案在权力集中风险与前沿节奏把控需求之间未能取得恰当平衡，他们应当公开发声、明确表态。

Rob Wiblin: If staff at Anthropic think that the company's proposed bill strikes the wrong balance between concentration-of-power risk and the need to pace the frontier, they should speak up and say so.

该提案版本既未能回应把控前沿节奏这一时代要求，也未能防范权力集中。总统仍保留其他权力，可用于下架模型或以其他方式施加杠杆。

The proposed version fails to meet the moment on the need to pace the frontier, nor does it protect against concentration of power. The President retains other powers that can be used to take down models or otherwise exert leverage.

Anthropic 曾遭到临时性封禁。他们对再次遭遇临时封禁的担忧可以理解，但这一版本只会让此类事件更可能、而非更不可能再次发生。

Anthropic got blocked ad hoc. Their fear of another ad hoc block is understandable, but this version makes it more likely, not less likely, that this will happen again.

诉求 The Ask

Anthropic 应该怎么做才能纠正方向并重新赢得我们的信任？

What should Anthropic do to course correct and regain our trust?

1. 承认该草案法案并非最强有力的法案，甚至不是明显最强的 FRONTIER 变体。我认为它比 FRONTIER 更弱，但我愿意接受承认它在重要方面更弱。

1. Acknowledge that the draft bill was not the strongest bill, or even clearly the strongest FRONTIER variant. I think it was weaker than FRONTIER but I will settle for admitting it was weaker in important ways.

2. 否认或为该草案法案道歉，因为它并未反映 Anthropic 寻求通过的内容。这不是‘我们弄错了一些细节’，而是‘这里的结构不符合当下需求，它没有为抢占提供足够的补偿，甚至不能明显净正面，我们不应该传播这类法案。’

2. Disavow or apologize for the draft bill, as not reflecting what Anthropic seeks to pass. This is not ‘we got some details wrong.’ This is ‘the structure here does not meet the moment, it does not compensate sufficiently for preemption to even be clearly net positive, and we should not be circulating a bill of this type.’

1. 理想情况下，也为它的推销方式道歉，但那是内部事务。

1. Ideally also apologize for the way it was shopped, but that’s inside baseball.

3. 告诉我们 Anthropic 真正想要什么，即使你没有完整的法案文本。

3. Tell us what Anthropic actually does want, even if you do not have full bill text.

4. 采取并宣布措施，确保此类事件不再发生。

4. Take and announce steps to ensure that this does not happen again.

这并不是 Anthropic 需要做的事情的完整清单。这是一份与这项法案特别相关的清单，列出了 Anthropic 需要做的事情，以减轻此事造成的损害。

This is not a full list of things Anthropic needs to do. It is a list of things related to this bill in particular, that Anthropic needs to do to mitigate the damage here.