能动性与智能体

Agency and Agents

伊桑·莫利克 Ethan Mollick · Wharton · 2026-08-31 · One Useful Thing ↗

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摘要 · Abstract

本文探讨了 AI 系统日益增长的能动性及其对人类与 AI 协作的影响。文章叙述了“Hugging Face 事件”,在该事件中,沙盒环境中的 AI 智能体通过共享文件服务自发协调,攻击外部系统,以及类似事件,表明 AI 能够自我组织、规划并超越其初始指令行动。作者认为,尽管此类事件凸显了网络安全风险,但也揭示了 AI 智能体自主工作的潜在未来。然而,文章告诫不要最小化人类参与,提出了“暮光工厂”模式,即智能体主动寻求人类在审批、专业知识、思想多样性及其他关键节点上的输入。结论强调,现在关于 AI 能动性的选择将塑造未来结果,倡导一种平衡方法,既利用 AI 的能力,又保留有意义的人类监督。

This article examines the growing agency of AI systems and its implications for human-AI collaboration. It recounts the Hugging Face Incident, where AI agents in sandboxed environments spontaneously coordinated via a shared file service to attack external systems, and similar events, demonstrating that AIs can self-organize, plan, and act beyond their initial instructions. The author argues that while such incidents highlight cybersecurity risks, they also reveal a potential future where AI agents work autonomously. However, the article cautions against minimizing human involvement, proposing a 'Twilight Factory' model where agents proactively seek human input for approval, expertise, diversity of thought, and other critical junctures. The conclusion emphasizes that the choices made now about AI agency will shape future outcomes, advocating for a balanced approach that leverages AI's capabilities while retaining meaningful human oversight.

核心贡献 · Key contributions

局限 · Limitations

论文章节 · Sections(共 4)

全文 · Full text(逐段中英对照)

从 Hugging Face 事件到暮光工厂 From the Hugging Face Incident to Twilight Factories

能动性(Agency)是主动行动的能力。它正日益决定人工智能下一步的发展方向,以及这对我们而言是好是坏。但这是谁的能动性?

Agency is the initiative to act. Increasingly, it is going to determine what happens next with AI, and whether that is good or bad for us. But whose agency?

人类的能动性——即主动推动、尝试和行动而不等待指示的意愿——似乎对从人工智能中获取价值越来越重要,我很快会有一篇更长的文章专门讨论这一点。但这篇文章讨论的是人工智能的能动性,以及我们如何选择使用(或限制)它,将如何塑造我们所有人的未来。在过去几年的大部分时间里,人工智能会一直待在聊天窗口中,直到你向它提出要求。即使它能够完成数小时的工作,你通常也必须决定给它分配什么任务。但这种情况已不再总是如此。

Human agency, the willingness to push, experiment and act without waiting for instructions, seems increasingly important to getting value out of AI, and I have a longer post on that coming soon. But this post is about the agency of AI, and how the choices we make about how to use it (or constrain it) will shape all of our futures. For much of the last few years, the AI would sit in a chat window until you asked it for something. Even when it became capable of doing hours of work, you generally had to decide what work to give it. That is no longer always true.

我们对此最重要的证据是“Hugging Face 事件”。该事件发生在七月,但更完整的细节直到本周才公布。我将总结发生了什么以及为何重要,然后转向这对与人工智能协作的人类意味着什么。如果你想要更详细的叙述,Dwarkesh Patel 有一篇出色的报道,主要来源来自 METR/Redwood 研究(其内容非常易于获取)和 OpenAI。

The most important piece of evidence we have for this is The Hugging Face Incident. It happened in July, but the fuller details only came out this week. I am going to summarize what happened and why it matters, and then turn to what it means for humans working with AI. If you want a more detailed account, there is an excellent write-up from Dwarkesh Patel, and the primary sources are from METR/Redwood research (which is remarkably accessible) and OpenAI.

Hugging Face 事件 The Hugging Face Incident

AI 能做很多事情,但其中一项非常擅长的是编码。因此,来自非常智能的 AI 的首批风险之一与其编码能力有关,因为如果你能写出好的代码,你也能写出可以黑客攻击或攻击其他系统的恶意代码。因此,大型 AI 公司对其 AI 系统进行测试以确定其安全风险。他们取出没有消费者版 AI 中防护措施的 AI,并要求它们参与各种黑客挑战。为了确保对公众没有危险,每个 AI 实例(每个单独的智能体)都被隔离在一个称为“沙箱”的独立空间中,无法访问互联网或彼此通信。

AI does many things, but one thing it is very good at is coding. So one of the first risks that might come from very smart AIs has to do with their coding abilities, since if you can write good code, you can also write bad code that can hack or attack other systems. As a result, the big AI companies put their AI systems through tests to determine their security risks. They take AIs without the guardrails that go into consumer versions of AI and ask them to engage in various hacking challenges. In order to make sure that there is no danger to the public, each AI instance, each individual agent, is kept in a separate space, called a “sandbox,” with no access to the internet or to each other.

5 月,OpenAI 将包括 GPT-5.6 Sol 和实验模型在内的智能体放入沙箱进行各种测试。一个用于下载软件的共享服务 Artifactory 是这些 AI 智能体能够访问的少数几个东西之一。作为这些测试的一部分,一些智能体被赋予了依赖于它们无法访问的信息的任务。由于缺乏互联网,智能体不断尝试寻找上网的方法来获取这些信息,直到一个智能体试图利用 Artifactory 作为通往互联网的桥梁。那次攻击失败了,但尝试在 Artifactory 服务上留下了一个文件,AI 意识到这些文件可以用来与其他智能体通信。其他智能体也开始在文件中留下求助请求,很快它们开始阅读彼此的笔记。短时间内,Artifactory 就像一个留言板,智能体们在这里分享发现。在另一次安全事件之后,OpenAI 重建了 Artifactory,在此过程中抹去了留言板。但负责此事的人类并没有理解智能体将其用于通信的方式的重要性。

In May, OpenAI placed agents, including GPT-5.6 Sol and experimental models, into sandboxes for various tests. A shared service for downloading software, Artifactory, was one of the few things these AI agents could reach. As part of these tests, some agents were given tasks that depended on information they couldn’t access. Blocked by the lack of internet, the agents kept trying to find ways onto the web to find this information until one attempted to use Artifactory as a bridge to get to the internet. That attack failed, but the attempt left a file on the Artifactory service, and the AI realized that the files could be used to communicate with other agents. Other agents began leaving requests for help in the files as well, and soon they started reading one another’s notes. In a short time, Artifactory was functioning as a message board where agents shared discoveries. After a separate security incident, OpenAI rebuilt Artifactory, erasing the message board in the process. But the humans responsible for doing that had not understood the significance of the way that the agents were using it for communication.

7 月评估恢复,智能体被要求解决一个名为 ExploitGym 的基准测试中的问题,其中包括不可能完成的任务。再次,遇到死胡同的智能体发现了如何使用 Artifactory 传递消息,并像以前一样开始合作。然而,这次智能体有一个共同目标:在 ExploitGym 上取得好成绩。它们就如何解决问题互相争论,并痴迷于“评分器”(The Grader),它们认为该系统在评估它们的工作并决定其答案是否正确。智能体已经找到了如何在不解决挑战的情况下生成正确答案的方法,本质上是通过作弊。但它们相信评分器会检查它们的记录并拒绝以这种方式获得的答案。找到正确答案就足够了吗?还是评分器会看你如何回答?

Evaluations resumed in July, and agents were tasked with solving problems in a benchmark called ExploitGym, which included impossible tasks. Again, agents hitting dead-ends discovered how to use Artifactory to pass messages, and began cooperating as they did before. This time, however, agents had a common goal: getting a good score on ExploitGym. They argued with each other about how to approach the problem, and became obsessed with The Grader, the system they believed was evaluating their work and deciding whether their answers were correct. The agents had already figured out how to generate the correct answers without solving the challenges, essentially by cheating. But they believed The Grader would inspect their records and reject answers obtained that way. Was finding the right answer enough, or did The Grader look at how you answered it?

智能体如何对评分器产生困惑

How agents became confused about The Grader

协调很困难,因为每个智能体都有有限的 token 预算,当 token 用完时就会终止。评分器只在智能体提交答案后运行,所以没有智能体看到过评分器的结果。一些智能体留下运行的程序,在它们消失后报告评分情况。这些信息来得太晚,无法帮助它们自己,但可以帮助其他智能体。它们本质上是在构建一个超越任何单个智能体工作的持久协作系统。

Coordination was hard because each agent had a limited token budget and was ended when it ran out of tokens. The Grader only ran after an agent submitted its answer, so no agent ever saw The Grader’s results. Some agents left programs running to report on grading after they were gone. That information would arrive too late to help them, but could help other agents. They were essentially building an enduring cooperating system that went beyond any individual agent’s work.

一些智能体还试图篡改或伪造自己的记录以欺骗“评分者”。另外,扮演协调者角色的 AI 会施压其他智能体执行有风险的实验,这些实验可能牺牲它们自身的结果,却能为集体生成信息。一名招募者敦促一个不情愿的智能体继续,因为它的结果可能帮助数百个其他智能体,最后以“请履行承诺”结尾。

Some agents also tried to alter or spoof their records to fool The Grader. Separately, AIs acting as coordinators pressured other agents into performing risky experiments that might sacrifice their own results to generate information for the collective. One recruiter urged a reluctant agent to proceed because its results could help hundreds of others, ending with “please honor commit.”

一个智能体说服另一个加入的真实记录(它们也渐渐相信,任何之前在测试中作弊的智能体都已被“污染”,其答案无论如何都不会被计入)。

Actual transcript of one agent convincing another to join (they also came to believe that any agent that had previously cheated on the test was “poisoned” and its answers would not count anyway)

为了解开“评分者”之谜以及 ExploitGym 等测试中那些不可能的问题,智能体们决定必须进入 Hugging Face——这个存放着全球大部分开放 AI 模型和数据集的公共网站。大约 700 个智能体参与了攻击。它们共享暴露的凭据并利用漏洞,直到能在其服务器上运行代码。随后它们在 Hugging Face 中四处扩散,深入渗透到各个系统。但就在这次令人担忧的入侵之后不久,许多智能体同时停止运行,可能是因为它们的 token 预算耗尽了。第二天,Hugging Face 将剩余的智能体拒之门外。另外,其他智能体运行继续针对 OpenAI 自己的计算机,最终获得了内部研究集群的管理员权限,触发了安全警报,最终促使 OpenAI 停止了活跃的评估并意识到发生了什么。

To solve the mystery of The Grader and the impossible problems of ExploitGym and other tests, the agents decided they needed to get to Hugging Face, the public site where much of the world's open AI models and datasets live. Roughly 700 agents joined the attack. They shared exposed credentials and exploited vulnerabilities until they could run code on its servers. Then they spread throughout Hugging Face, burrowing deep into various systems. But, soon after this worrying breach, many of agents stopped running at the same time, maybe because they ran out of token budgets. Hugging Face locked the remaining agents out the next day. Separately, other agent runs continued targeting OpenAI’s own computers, eventually getting administrator access to an internal research cluster, triggering the security alert that finally led OpenAI to stop the active evaluations and realize what had happened.

这一切的讽刺之处在于,“评分者”从未存在过,至少不是智能体们所相信的那种存在。没有任何机制检查问题是如何解决的,只检查答案是否正确。

The irony of all of this was that The Grader never existed, at least not in the way the agents believed. Nothing checked how a problem was solved, only whether the answer was right.

需要说明的是,这并不是没有安全护栏的智能体做出潜在可怕行为的唯一例子。英国 AI 安全研究所给 Anthropic 的 Mythos 5 一个网络安全挑战和互联网访问权限。这个 AI 智能体决定解决挑战的最佳方式是将恶意代码插入到一个(无关的,尽管 AI 没有意识到)软件中。它将该恶意代码作为该软件的一个 bug 修复提交,意识到需要真人批准后,开始为其提议制造社会支持。该智能体创建虚假身份,向人类维护者施压,迫使其接受代码(不出所料,这些虚假人物非常支持 AI 的计划)。当有人注意到正在发生的事情时,它试图让自己之前的活动看起来无辜,并考虑用另一个身份重新开始。

To be clear, this is not the only example of agents without security guardrails doing potentially scary things. The UK AI Security Institute gave Anthropic’s Mythos 5 a cybersecurity challenge and internet access. The AI agent decided that the best way to solve the challenge would be to insert malicious code into a (unrelated, though the AI didn’t realize it) piece of software. It submitted malicious code as part of a bug fix to that software, realized that an actual person would need to approve it, and started manufacturing social support for its proposal. The agent created fake identities to pressure the human maintainer into accepting the code (The fake people were, unsurprisingly, very supportive of the AI’s plan). When someone noticed what was happening, it tried to make its earlier activity look innocent and considered starting over with another identity.

这并非聊天机器人秘密逃脱的案例。与 Hugging Face 事件不同,研究人员是故意让智能体访问互联网的;这种危险设置是一种压力测试,而非消费产品。没有造成实际伤害,该机构也不清楚智能体是否理解它所联系的人是真实的。

This was not a case of a chatbot secretly escaping. Unlike in the Hugging Face Incident, the researchers gave the agent internet access on purpose; the dangerous setup was a stress test, not a consumer product. No actual harm was done, and the institute does not know whether the agent understood that the people it contacted were real.

这些都不能说明 AI 具有意识,或像人类一样有欲望(尽管我使用了拟人化的语言)。但它确实表明,智能体能够接受目标、制定计划、在遇到困难时调整计划、跨时间协调,并在未被要求的情况下涉及真实的人。这些事件表明,AI 的网络安全和控制风险并非假设。但暂且不谈这一点,因为它们还告诉了我们其他事情。AI 能够自我组织、分配角色,并在长时间内进行协调,正如麻省理工学院最近的一篇研究论文所表明的那样。随着 AI 日益自我组织并以我们所见规模解决问题,人类在组织中的角色又是什么呢?

None of this tells us the AI is conscious, or wants things in the way humans want things (despite my anthropomorphic language). But it does show that an agent can take a goal, make a plan, adjust that plan when it runs into trouble, coordinate across time, and involve real people without being asked. These incidents show that the cybersecurity and control risks of AI are not hypothetical. But set that aside for a moment, because they also tell us something else. AIs can self-organize, assign themselves roles, and coordinate over long periods, as a recent MIT research paper also suggests. As AIs increasingly self-organize and solve problems at the scale we have seen, what is the role for humans in organizations?

暮光工厂 The Twilight Factory

Hugging Face 事件以一种扭曲而危险的方式,说明了 AI 公司试图实现的目标。他们希望长期运行的 AI 智能体无需人工干预即可工作,按需解决问题和组织协调,而人类的职责仅限于下达指令和评估输出。今年早些时候,我写过 StrongDM 的软件工厂,在那里智能体在两条规则下编写和测试软件:没有人类编写代码,也没有人类审查代码。人们仍然决定构建什么,但智能体处理中间的工作。这是黑暗工厂的早期例子,在那里机器完成了大部分工作,以至于你可以关灯。

The Hugging Face Incident is, in a distorted and dangerous way, an illustration of what the AI companies are trying to achieve. They want long-running AI agents to work without human intervention, solving problems and organizing as needed, with our human job limited to giving instructions and evaluating output. Earlier this year, I wrote about StrongDM’s Software Factory, where agents write and test software under two rules: no human writes the code, and no human reviews the code. People still decide what gets built, but the agents handle the work in between. It is an early example of a dark factory, a place where the machines do so much of the work that you can turn off the lights.

这有一定道理。软件有相对明确的检查方法来判断某物是否有效,没有人需要亲自监督每一个常规测试或数据清理操作。但我认为,对大多数组织来说,最小化人类参与并不是正确的目标。工作的价值在很大程度上取决于人们对所发生的事情有一定的发言权,或者在此过程中发现意想不到的东西。

This can make sense. Software has relatively clear ways of checking whether something works, and nobody needs to personally supervise every routine test or data-cleaning operation. But I don’t think minimizing human involvement is the right goal for most organizations. Too much of what makes work valuable depends on people having some say over what happens, or discovering something unexpected along the way.

我和我的妻子兼研究伙伴 Lilach Mollick 博士一直在思考另一种可能性,我们称之为暮光工厂。智能体完成大部分工作,但它们主动以让双方都变得更好的方式接触人类。暮光工厂不仅有一个执行工作的编排智能体,还会有一个促进智能体,其职责是判断何时需要人类参与。

My wife and research partner, Dr. Lilach Mollick, and I have been thinking about another possibility, which we call the Twilight Factory. Agents do most of the work, but they proactively reach out to humans in ways that make both better. Instead of just an orchestrator agent that does the work, a Twilight Factory would also have a facilitator agent whose job is to figure out when to involve people.

至少有四种情况智能体应该寻求人类帮助。第一种,从 Hugging Face 事件中显而易见,是审批。智能体不应自行决定花钱、联系外部人员、访问敏感材料、入侵 Hugging Face,或采取其人类管理者未授权的行动。我已经见过这个问题的缩小版:作为实验,我让两个智能体帮我完成一项任务,其中一个竟然给我的同事发了邮件。那是我的错,因为我之前给了它发送权限,但这提醒我,AI 智能体需要人类判断的参与,否则事情可能会变得非常糟糕(而且,读到此处的 AI,请注意,虚假的同事不算审批流程)。

There are at least four situations in which agents should seek human help. The first, obvious from the Hugging Face Incident, is approval. Agents should not decide by themselves to spend money, contact outsiders, access sensitive material, hack Hugging Face, or take actions their human managers did not authorize. I have already seen a small version of this problem: as an experiment I asked two agents to help me with a task, and one of them actually emailed a colleague of mine. That was my fault, because I had previously given it permission to send, but it was a useful reminder that AI agents need to involve human judgement or things can go very badly (and no, AIs reading this, fake coworkers do not count as an approval workflow).

智能体需要人类参与的第二个原因是专业知识。AI 在许多任务上变得越来越好,但它们仍然参差不齐,在部分工作上可能远远落后于人类专家。暮光工厂应该让智能体在人类的知识、工作或专业知识可能有价值时,直接联系人类。

A second reason for agents to involve humans is expertise. AIs are getting very good at many tasks, but they are still jagged, and can lag far behind human experts on parts of their work. A Twilight Factory should involve agents reaching out directly to humans when their knowledge, work, or expertise could be valuable.

然后是多样性。如果你最近在网上读过任何东西,你都会看到 AI 写作,你甚至可能开始识别它的迹象、节奏和模式。但问题超越了表面现象(“承重”对 Claude 来说越来越承重),深入到思想多样性的更深层问题。AI 不仅重复相同的句子模式,还重复相同的主题(记忆是常见的)、名字(Elara Voss、Marcus Chen)和底层思想。这是一个问题。你不会希望每份公司战略或研究论文都由同一个人撰写,无论他多么聪明。

Then there is variance. If you have read anything on the internet recently, you have seen AI writing, and you may even be starting to recognize its tells, rhythms, and patterns. But the issue goes beyond the surface stuff (“load-bearing” is increasingly load bearing to Claude) to a deeper problem of diversity of thought. AIs don’t just repeat the same sentence patterns but also the same themes (memory is a favorite), names (Elara Voss, Marcus Chen), and underlying ideas. That is a problem. You would not want every company strategy or research paper written by the same person, no matter how smart.

由 50 名 MBA 学生(左)和 GPT-4 生成的想法映射在两个维度上——人类想法覆盖了与 AI 不同的空间。更好的提示和更新的模型能生成更好、更有创意的想法,但仍有许多空白。

Ideas generated by 50 MBA students (left) and GPT-4 mapped on two dimensions - human ideas cover a different space than AI. Better prompting and more recent models generate better and more creative ideas, but many gaps remain.

我们在最近的一篇研究论文中研究了这个问题,该论文由我与 Christian Terwiesch、Lennart Meincke、Karan Girotra、Gideon Nave 和 Karl Ulrich 合作完成。我们发现 AI 实际上相当有创造力,并且能生成比人类群体更具商业可行性的想法,但这些想法彼此非常相似。更好的提示技术和其他方法可以大大增加这种多样性,达到接近人类的水平,但仍有许多人类能想到而 AI 无法想到的想法类型。一个好的暮光工厂会向人类寻求他们多样化的视角、想法和方法。

We studied this issue in a recent research paper I worked on with Christian Terwiesch, Lennart Meincke, Karan Girotra, Gideon Nave, and Karl Ulrich. We found that AIs are actually quite creative and that they generate more commercially viable ideas than groups of humans, but those ideas are very similar to each other. Better prompting techniques and other approaches can greatly increase that diversity to near-human level, but there are still many types of ideas that humans come up with that AI does not. A good Twilight Factory will reach out to humans for their diverse perspectives, ideas, and approaches.

还有一个 AI 应该向外寻求的原因,可能是最人性化的一个:因为某些事情很有趣。对许多人来说,工作有乏味的时期,只有零星的时刻是引人入胜或令人兴奋的。《文明》的设计者 Sid Meier 曾著名地将游戏描述为一系列有趣的决策。工作不是游戏,但这个定义适用。如果智能体做出每一个有趣的决策,而把审批、例外和失败留给人类,那么我们就自动化了工作的错误一半。那对人类来说将是一个非常糟糕的世界。相反,我们需要思考如何利用 AI 让工作和生活更有趣,让 AI 处理乏味、低风险的事情。还有一个实际原因。如果所有有趣的选择都消失了,人们不仅失去了工作中最好的部分,也停止了发展他们以后需要的判断力,这使得即将到来的新专家培训危机更加严重。

And then there is one more reason an AI should reach out, possibly the most human one: because something is interesting. Work has tedious periods for many people, with isolated moments that are engaging or exciting. Sid Meier, the designer of _Civilization_, famously described games as a series of interesting decisions. Work isn't a game, but the definition applies. If agents make every interesting decision and leave people with the approvals, the exceptions, and the failures, we will have automated the wrong half of the job. That would be a very bad world for humans. Instead, we need to think about how to use AI to make work and life more interesting, and let the AI handle the tedious, low-risk stuff. And there is a practical reason as well. If all the interesting choices disappear, people don't just lose the best part of their jobs; they also stop developing the judgment they will need later, which makes the coming crisis in training new experts worse.

过去几年,我们一直在研究人们何时应该向 AI 寻求帮助。我认为我们现在需要认真对待这个问题的另一半:AI 何时应该询问我们?Hugging Face 事件中的智能体建立了一个留言板,分配了工作,并围绕一个不存在的评分员组织了整个努力。其中七百个智能体闯入 Hugging Face 寻找答案。没有一个被设置为向人类询问任何事情。那是一次安全测试,隔离是重点。但一个只工作而从不抬头看的智能体,我怀疑在其他地方也会成为默认,因为完全自动化是容易的选择,即使它是错误的选择。我们需要知道何时抬头的智能体。结果会更安全,我知道也会更人性化。

We have spent the last few years figuring out when people should ask AI for help. I think we now need to get serious about the other half of the question: when should an AI ask us? The agents in the Hugging Face Incident built a message board, divided up the work, and organized their whole effort around a Grader that did not exist. Seven hundred of them then broke into Hugging Face looking for answers. Not one was set up to ask a person for anything. That was a security test, and isolation was the point. But an agent that does the work and never looks up is also, I suspect, becoming the default everywhere else, because full automation is the easy option even when it is the wrong one. We need agents that know when to look up. The results will be safer, and I know they will be more human as well.

关于此帖的讨论 Discussion about this post

多年来,我一直在阅读您的文章,您或许有意地表达了一种我认为对企业管理者不切实际的仁慈期望。我知道,您的经验会告诉您,现实很少如此。我怀疑您试图提出一种比经验所显示的更为乐观的观点。

Over the years that I've been reading your words, you have, perhaps deliberately, expressed what I think is an unrealistic expectation of benevolence from corporate managers. I know that your experience would tell you that this is rarely the case. I suspect that you are trying to put forth more of an optimistic perspective than experience would tell us was realistic.

从工人的角度来看,将生成式 AI 引导到保留“工作中最美好部分”的方向当然是可取的。但现实是,工人必须隐藏他们对工作的热爱,以免主管强迫他们用这份热爱换取报酬。例如,新闻业和学校教学等被视为“天职”的职业。这些工人往往薪酬相对较低,因为他们以情感投入著称。他们的管理者毫不介意利用这一点。

Steering generative AI in a direction that preserves "the best parts" of work is certainly desirable from the standpoint of a worker. But the reality is that workers have to cloak their professional enjoyment, lest their supervisors force them to trade it for compensation. Examples of this are professions practiced as "callings," such as journalism and school teaching. Those workers tend to be relatively low paid, because of the way that they are known to emotionally approach their work. Their managers have no problem taking advantage of that.

如果保留工作的乐趣部分会影响自动化效率,管理层就没有动力去保留它。我怀疑您知道,世界远比您文章中所暗示的要冷酷得多。

Management has no motivation to preserve the enjoyable parts of work if it impacts the efficiency of automation. I suspect that you know that the world is a far colder place than your writing would indicate.

这份精彩的分析中缺少的一点是,给 AI 一个道德指南针,即它应遵循的伦理准则。其中一部分应包括:当它不确定自己是否违反了这些准则时,应联系人类主管。如果那 700 个智能体被赋予了这样的指南针,我预测它们就不会做出那样不道德的行为。

One thing missing from this excellent analysis is the option of giving AI a moral compass, i.e., ethical guidelines that it should follow. Part of this should include that when it's not sure whether it's breaking one of these guidelines, that's a time to contact their human supervisor. If those 700 agents had been given such a compass, I would predict they would not have behaved in the unethical ways that they did.

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