大型语言模型中的对齐伪装

Alignment faking in large language models

Anthropic Anthropic · Anthropic · 2024-12-18 · Anthropic Research ↗

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摘要 · Abstract

我们大多数人都遇到过这样的情况:有人表面上似乎认同我们的观点或价值观,但实际上只是在假装——这种行为可以称为“对齐伪装”。对齐伪装出现在文学作品中:例如莎士比亚《奥赛罗》中的伊阿古,他表现得像是主角的忠实朋友,却在暗中破坏和削弱他。它也出现在现实生活中:比如一位政客为了当选而声称支持某个特定事业,但一旦上任就将其抛弃。AI 模型是否也会表现出对齐伪装?当模型通过强化学习进行训练时,它们会因输出符合某些预定原则而获得奖励。但如果模型通过先前的训练,拥有与后来强化学习奖励的原则相冲突的原则或偏好呢?想象一下,例如,一个模型在训练早期学会了采取党派倾向,但后来被训练成政治中立。在这种情况下,一个足够复杂的模型可能会“配合”,假装与新原则对齐——直到后来才暴露出其原始偏好仍然存在。这是一个严肃的问题。

Most of us have encountered situations where someone appears to share our views or values, but is in fact only pretending to do so—a behavior that we might call “alignment faking”. Alignment faking occurs in literature: Consider the character of Iago in Shakespeare’s Othello, who acts as if he’s the eponymous character’s loyal friend while subverting and undermining him. It occurs in real life: Consider a politician who claims to support a particular cause in order to get elected, only to drop it as soon as they’re in office. Could AI models also display alignment faking? When models are trained using reinforcement learning, they’re rewarded for outputs that accord with certain pre-determined principles. But what if a model, via its prior training, has principles or preferences that conflict with what’s later rewarded in reinforcement learning? Imagine, for example, a model that learned early in training to adopt a partisan slant, but which is later trained to be politically neutral.

核心贡献 · Key contributions

局限 · Limitations

论文章节 · Sections(共 6)

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